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Abstract.   Hundreds of thousands of United States military service members are suffering 
from PTSD and other psychological health conditions as a result of their wartime service.  A 
myriad of possible system interventions and resource allocation schemas have been 
researched and proposed, but finite budgets and manpower dictate a careful allocation of 
resources to optimize outcomes.  We describe a stock-and-flow model of psychological 
health treatment tailored to the unique context of the military’s healthcare system.  Our 
model, implemented as a “Management Flight Simulator”, reports the impact of system 
interventions on areas of stakeholder concern and is designed to communicate complex 





Introduction: An Unfamiliar Fight 
The United States’ military is commonly recognized as the greatest fighting force in history.  
In March of 2003, as expected, it soundly defeated the Iraqi armed forces during the invasion 
of Iraq.  Soon after, however, all of the United States’ might could not soundly defeat their 
new enemy, the burgeoning insurgency.  For years, the situation continued to deteriorate.  
However, the 2007 decisions to increase manpower and adopt substantial strategic and 
tactical adjustments were viewed as a turning point, even by some of the war’s most vocal 
critics.  The common description of the changes, the single word “Surge”, obscures many of 
the most important causes of the war’s turnaround such as the adoption of counterinsurgency 
doctrine (COIN) as a force-wide policy and fundamental changes in the attitudes of subsets 
of the Iraqi population.   
 
With helicopters and medics standing by to evacuate wounded soldiers and hospitals capable 
of treating the most acute physical injuries spread around the entire planet, the military’s 
healthcare system is clearly a highly capable organization.  But like their war-fighting 
capability in the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military’s healthcare 
system was designed to perform a specific set of missions, and was not fully prepared for the 
challenges it would face.   
 
The growing number of mental health problems within the force has overburdened the 
military healthcare system, which was not designed or prepared to treat the large number of 
servicemen and women suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other 
Psychological Health (PH) issues, the “signature wounds” of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 
The Department of Defense and other institutions have responded with a concerted effort to 
understand the situation at hand (with over 900 current PTSD research projects nationwide), 
and determine the best path forward.   A large base of fundamental research from civilian 
treatment has now been augmented by recent findings specific to the United States Military.  
Research has yielded a wealth of data and a substantial amount of information derived from 
it.  As a result, countless system interventions have been proposed, but constraints dictate that 
not all can be fully implemented.   
The Hard Facts 
The United States Department of Defense Mental Health Advisory Team found that 38% of 
Soldiers (Army), 31% of Marines and nearly half of National Guard troops deployed in Iraq 
and Afghanistan reported psychological symptoms11. 
 
PTSD, an anxiety disorder that can result from combat stress, is a major concern for military 
leadership and the public at large, and is part of a range psychological health issues facing 
service members and their families.  The yearly impact of lost productivity from military 
PTSD alone is in the billions of dollars15– and this does not begin to describe the true social 
costs borne by returning service members and their families. 
 
Key Opportunities for Improvement 
The military’s psychological healthcare system is ripe for improvement.  Research to date has 
identified several failures within the system as well as several emerging opportunities for 
  
intervention.  The listing here is by no means exhaustive, but highlights some central 
concepts for those new to the subject. 
Gaps in Access to Care and Quality of Care 
Half of service members afflicted with PTSD or MDD do not receive help.  Of those who do, 
almost half do not receive care that has been proven to be the most effective15. Many 
providers within the distributed (organizationally and geographically) military health system 
are unable to meet the growing demand for care.  In many cases, even soldiers who do seek 
care are unable to find a provider with any availability. Inadequate staffing and funding 
surely contribute to this gap in access11. 
Prevention and Resilience 
Across the services, several programs are aimed at preparing service members for combat 
stress and preventing PTSD9,15,16.  These programs have the potential to have a major system 
wide impact by reducing the number of soldiers affected by PTSD and by reducing stigma. 
Stigma 
One of the most prevalent issues regarding access to care is the stigma associated with these 
conditions.  The effects of social misconceptions about these disorders are magnified in the 
military, where individual strength is emphasized.  Very large proportions of Soldiers and 
Marines report being unwilling to seek treatment for fear of negative repercussions.  
Servicemen and women fear losing the respect of their unit, looking weak, and negative 
career impacts15.  Changes in stigma have the potential to drastically affect the number of 
active military personnel and veterans who seek care. 
Challenges in Addressing Mental Health in the Armed Services 
Policy makers and military leadership face challenging decisions in allocating resources and 
political capital to competing programs both within the Military Health System (MHS) and 
within the greater military.  The former Chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin, Norm 
Augustine, described a critical challenge faced in healthcare at large which is particularly 
relevant to the issue discussed here: 
 
 “Systems engineering has had an enormous impact in any number of fields, but at 
 least from my perspective, it is only beginning to be applied in healthcare.  Part of the 
 reason, I suspect, is that so many of the issues in healthcare are difficult to quantify 
 societal questions, such as, should you spend the next marginal dollar on prevention, 
 on research, or on treatment of the stricken?” 4 
 
To decide between so many seemingly worthy suggestions to improve the system, we must 
analyze their impact across a broad range of important areas.  These include productivity, 
force readiness, costs, retention, and the moral imperative asserted by Admiral Mike Mullen, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
 
 “This isnʼt just a debt of gratitude.  This is a debt that must be repaid because they 
 have sacrificed so much.  They have done exactly what this country has asked.  
 They have fought and suffered and their lives have been affected forever.” 
 
Communicating and Understanding System-Level Impacts 
 
  
Even for a subject matter expert, understanding the expected effects of various system 
interventions can be daunting in a complex service system like healthcare.  This is doubly so 
in the military where patients are also employees of the larger enterprise.  Communicating 
these effects to stakeholders without domain expertise can be even more difficult.  Research 
into the limits of human decision-making shows that mental models of complex systems are 
nearly universally insufficient19.  With policy makers at all levels relying on abstractions of 
data and upon the information and knowledge generated by that data’s analysis, we must be 
able to clearly communicate the insights generated by research21.  Augmenting and correcting 
stakeholders’ mental models will be essential to architecting a system that meets 
stakeholders’ most important needs18. 
 
Successfully implementing solutions to the shortcomings of the military’s psychological 
health care system will not rely on unilateral decision-making and orders passed down 
through the entire military.  Instead, it will depend on addressing the needs of a host of 
stakeholders13 including warfighters, their families, leaders and care providers in the Military 
Health System, providers in private practice, congress, and military leadership from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to the platoon level. An in-depth analysis of the stakeholders in this system 
can be found in Ippolito 2010, (also published in this conference’s proceedings) 10.   
 
Research in the field of management shows that organizations have difficulty understanding 
and managing systems that have long feedback delays14 and slow-to-emerge secondary 
effects.  The intuition that the processes of recruiting, training, deploying, diagnosing and 
treating service members can exhibit feedback delay is supported by research into the 
creation of epidemiological models described below. 
Resource Modeling in the U.S. Military 
Resource models are important tools that help allocate finite resources more effectively.  In 
the context of military PH, resources in short supply include money, personnel, and private 
sector care capacity. 
A Brief History of Military Healthcare Resource Modeling 
Before the adoption of more sophisticated models, resources were allocated either 
subjectively or based on a set of standards and guidelines. In the 1970’s the Army began 
making an effort simply to measure the current use of manpower in existing organizations5.  
In 1983 the Army Health Services Command adopted a set of standards to be applied by 
individual facilities to determine staffing requirements called the Manpower Staffing 
Standard System (MS-3)20. This system was not without its drawbacks. The very nature of 
standards encouraged hiring but never releasing staff.  MS-3, therefore, was widely seen as 
ineffective5. 
 
In 1992, MS-3 was followed by the Benchmarking System developed by the Army Medical 
Department (AMEDD). The program was criticized as only focusing on very specific tasks 
within an MTF and not being thorough enough20.  As a result, the program was short lived 
and replaced (within the Army) by the more modern Automated Staffing Assessment Model 
(ASAM). 
ASAM 
ASAM is more sophisticated than previous attempts because it addresses the question of 
where to spend the next marginal dollar. The model projects the personnel needs for each 
  
type of staff based on patient-to-provider ratios.  In other words, the model provided a basis 
by which to prioritize resources within a given Military Hospital, known as a Military 
Treatment Facility (MTF) 20. 
 
The most important factor in ASAM’s staffing projections is the size of the population being 
treated at an MTF. The model is also advised, to a much lesser extent, by population 
projections. ASAM uses industry performance data from outside the military to help 
determine manpower requirements for each medical specialty. ASAM can also be tailored to 
the characteristics of any given MTF such as patient care hours, staff time spent performing 
ancillary duties, and provider-to-support technician ratio. With this information the model 
reports back staffing requirements for each MTF a variety of medical specialties such as 
physicians, nurses, and dentists6. 
PHRAMS 
In 2007, the Defense Health Board Task Force on Mental Health1 recommended:  
 
“The Department of Defense should adopt a risk-adjusted population-based model 
for allocating resources to military mental health facilities and services embedded in 
line units. Allocations should be regularly reviewed to update risk assessments.” 
 
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) was subsequently contracted to develop such a model.  
Their model, the Psychological Health Risk-Adjusted Model for Staffing (PHRAMS), 
projects staffing needs particular to psychological healthcare.  This list is more thorough than 
psychological health staffing recommendations generated by ASAM because it accounts for 
more provider types8.  However, PHRAMS does not account for costs the way ASAM does. 
 
PHRAMS requires many of the same inputs ASAM does. It differs, however, in its 
consideration of risk-adjusted attributes of the beneficiary population. For example, 
PHRAMS takes into account untreated prevalence, deployment severity (to adjust for the 
increased risk resulting from multiple deployments), and two major avenues of care (i.e. 
direct care and purchased care).  
Model Usage 
ASAM and PHRAMS are used simultaneously within the Army. PHRAMS produces more 
refined estimates of PH staffing needs, but stakeholder interviews suggest these projections 
are infeasible.  PHRAMS projections often greatly exceed the number of providers an MTF 
believes they can hire especially when treatment facilities have competing needs for staff in 
other specialties.  Unlike ASAM, which justifies its projection with a cost-benefit analysis, 
PHRAMS provides only a projection.   
 
PHRAMS’ more nuanced projections were designed to inform budget requests8 (the lag 
between making a request and actually bringing new staff on board can be over a year).  
Unfortunately, these projections do not help stakeholders allocate the resources they actually 
have at hand. 
A Mental Healthcare Flight Simulator 
Management Flight Simulators are guided activities in which decision makers have the 
opportunity to experiment with various courses of action without real-world consequences2.  
Using management flight simulators that provide immediate feedback, policy makers and 
  
other stakeholders can improve their mental models of various phenomena18.  Furthermore, 
rapidly simulating the effects of different policies enables informed communication and 
cooperation between stakeholders attempting to solve open-ended problems. 
 
We are developing a Military mental healthcare flight simulator.  The simulator will serve 
two purposes.  First, it will support our team’s broader efforts to architect the military 
psychological healthcare enterprise.  We will be able to quickly examine the combined 
effects of varied efforts and refine our own mental models.  Second, we will be able address 
two key problems associated with the models to date: their opaque nature and their failure to 
address the concerns of all stakeholders. 
 
Using this tool, we will be able to more effectively communicate the rationale behind our 
recommendations and the consequences of alternate approaches.  More importantly, the 
accessibility of this tool will allow stakeholders throughout the Department of Defense to 
evaluate the effects of any number of system interventions, and better learn the dynamics of 
the mental healthcare system. 
An Example from a Domain with Similar Challenges: Climate Rapid 
Overview and Decision-support System (C-ROADS) 
Like the challenge of delivering healthcare, solving climate change depends on creating a 
vision that will be embraced by stakeholders across the enterprise.  The underlying scientific 
models of climate change are complex, and beyond the understanding of those without 
domain-specific education.  There are countless possible input parameters and system 
interventions, and success is reflected in multiple metrics. 
 
Available for public access at www.climateinteractive.org, C-ROADS is designed to aid 
policy makers and the public at large in understanding the temporal relationship between 
greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change.   
 
The underlying system dynamics model is grounded in well-accepted scientific models and is 
consistent with the results of models used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC).  Users can evaluate a wide variety of possible scenarios and watch as carbon buildup, 
global temperature, and sea levels all change over time7.   
 
We view C-ROADS as an exemplar model demonstrating flexibility and accessibility while 
clearly communicating otherwise unwieldy system behavior.   
Our Implementation 
Outputs 
The design of our flight simulator began with an assessment of stakeholder value 
propositions and of probable gaps in their mental models.  Designing our flight simulator 
with these outputs in mind allowed us scope our underlying model to a manageable level of 
complexity without sacrificing relevance.  The most important outputs we identified were: 
 
• Service Members’ Access to Care – For warfighters and their families, a primary 
concern is their ability to seek care.  Often, providers are overburdened and unable to 
take on new patients.  These service members deploy and return home frequently (a 
full cycle is only 24 months), and eventually separate from the service.  Because of 
this, they need timely access to care.  We define access to care in terms of the 
  
percentage of afflicted individuals who receive treatment, the distribution of their 
waiting times and statistics on various circumstances that prevent them from receiving 
care (like deploying again before seeing a mental health professional). 
• Costs Incurred – Direct and indirect costs are accounted for.  Direct costs are 
measured as a change from the status quo (in this case, the current staffing levels and 
policy directives).  Indirect costs include the loss of productivity (as described in 
RAND 2008) that military incurs while its service members are afflicted with a PH 
condition but not yet treated.  Both direct and indirect costs are reported at 
organizationally relevant levels (such as the cost of care provided “in-house” vs. the 
cost of care provided by civilian providers in the “purchased care” sector). 
 
There are ample opportunities to expand this model to account for a host of important 
outputs.  Discussion of planned improvements to the model can be found in the “Future 
Work” section below. 
 
Inputs 
After analyzing the dependencies of our outputs, we identified a list of inputs most relevant 
to our model.  They are: 
 
• Unit locations, populations, and deployment projections – One unique aspect of the 
military healthcare is the constant geographic relocation of the system’s beneficiaries.  
Active duty personnel can only be treated at an MTF when they are home from 
combat, and so we explicitly account for this window of time.   
• Unit deployment histories – As one can infer from the higher incidence of PTSD and 
other psychological health conditions in the military, combat experience is an 
important predictor of an individual’s risk.  By utilizing data on the deployment 
histories of each brigade (in terms of the number of personnel on their first 
deployment, second deployment, etc.), we can more accurately predict the demand for 
care within each returning unit.   
• Separation rates – Every day new service members join the military while others 
leave.  While the population of the military as a whole might not change, its 
composition in terms of deployment histories and training received will change.  
Moreover, a person in need of treatment who separates may not be able to receive 
care when they leave the service, especially if they are not immediately employed. 
• Care Capacities – MTFs, unit resources, and the private sector all have particular 
capacities for providing care (in terms of a rate of hours of care provided per day).  
Needless to say, this information is integral to our model.   
 
The Underlying Model 
At its simplest level, ours is a “Stock and Flow” model.  We model the deployment and 
return of units and their resulting demand for care, and use that demand as the feed for a 
stock and flow process at a particular MTF (which might have several units which arrive and 
depart on different dates).   
 
Rather than track beneficiaries as a cohort or a homogenous group, we track them as 
individuals with particular traits (resiliency training, deployment histories, treatment 
histories, wait time, etc.).  This allows us to implement an added level of bookkeeping rather 
than simply recording inventories as a time series.  We can keep track of each individual’s 
experience including wait times or failure to receive care because of separation or 




This simulator demonstrates three behaviors that might not be captured in the pre-existing 
mental models of its users.   
 
• The Accumulation of a Patient Backlog – Accumulation in the military health system 
is markedly different than traditional civilian centers.  In typical healthcare scenarios, 
demand may change over time, but week-to-week variation is low (as dictated by the 
law of large numbers).  On the other hand, because of the deployment cycle, the 
military health centers can see hundreds of new patients arrive on base over the 
course of a week.  These new arrivals then wait in the backlog until they can be 
moved through the care system.  Therefore, even when an MTF has the capacity to 
treat as many patients as it is expecting on an annualized basis, it cannot necessarily 
deliver timely care. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Arrivals and backlog by day in a simple case with no units deploying 
 
• The sensitivity of costs and outcomes to the amount of direct care and purchased care 
available and unit arrival times – Direct care costs less to deliver than reimbursing a 
private provider, but it is not as flexible (not utilizing purchased care is free, whereas 
not accessing available direct care does mean the military does not pay those 
employees).  Therefore, a base which has unit arrivals spread evenly can more cost 
effectively utilize direct care where a base which sees concentrated arrivals will do 
better with more purchased care. 
• The systemic savings of treating patients – The military, unlike civilian insurers, 
employs its beneficiaries and bears a direct cost in lost productivity when its service 
members are not treated.   We have yet to fully characterize this behavior, but doing 
so will be important to the dialog between stakeholders with competing for money 
and manpower to accomplish their objectives. 
  
Future Work 
Over the coming months, we will continue the developing the model described here with the 
goal being to model the behavior of actual bases and units (as opposed to the hypothetical 
scenarios used in the simulator).  This will help us to examine real-world interventions and 
make informed recommendations about their systemic effects. 
 
In addition to applying the underlying model to real scenarios as data becomes available, we 
will: 
 
• Continue to refine our inputs and outputs – As we validate our assumptions and our 
outputs through stakeholder interviews, we will continue to refine them to ensure that 
we are addressing each stakeholder’s concerns and that we are representing real life 
processes accurately.  
• Refine our Underlying Model – Based on interviews and site visits to actual MTFs, 
we will refine the process depicted in our stock and flow model (currently a single 
treatment process) to include various assessments, referrals, pathways of care and 
treatment regimens.  This will help us more accurately identify points for effective 
intervention such as reducing bottlenecks. 
• Account for Latency in Symptom Presentation – Some PTSD patients do not show 
symptoms for month or years after their traumatic experiences.  Others, especially 
within the military, wait to report symptoms because they fear career repercussions.   
• Address the Issue of Suppressed Demand – Service members who do not seek care 
because they don’t have access are not well accounted for1.  We cannot confidently 
predict the amount of care that would be used in an unconstrained scenario (some will 
never seek care because of stigma, while others that wouldn’t have received care 
because of access constraints would make use of additional capacity). 
• Account for the effects of resiliency training – Resiliency training has been shown to 
reduce the impact of stress16, and is therefore predicted to reduce the number of 
service members afflicted.  It may also have the effect of reducing stigma and 
increasing the percentage of afflicted service members who come forward seeking 
care.  These two changes may occur at different speeds.  Making use of available data 
on resiliency programs may help us to predict what effect resiliency programs have on 
demand over time (for example, causing a short term increase, but long-term 
decrease).   
• Refine Analysis of Downstream Impacts – Lost productivity is one of many 
downstream impacts of the PH system that face the military.  Others include suicides, 
retention, substance abuse, and violent crime.  Characterizing these costs to the 
military (and others to society) will be important to assessing the value of various 
interventions. 
 
We also plan to validate the concept of our model and its results through interviews and the 
possible case study of a single MTF.  
Conclusion 
 
By modeling patient experience at a more refined level, capturing the systemic effects of 
decisions and demonstrating challenging-to-understand behaviors, our simulator should help 
and stakeholders within the U.S. military’s psychological healthcare system to analyze and 
compare the systemic effects of resource allocation decisions and policy directives. 
  
 
Augmenting mental models with a powerful but easy to understand computer model will 
ensure that the “next marginal dollar” (or hour, or staffing billet, or piece of political capital) 
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